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Abstract We conducted field experiments at a bar to test whether blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) correlates with violations of the generalized axiom of revealed
preference (GARP) and the independence axiom. We found that individuals with
BACs well above the legal limit for driving adhere to GARP and independence at
rates similar to those who are sober. This finding led to the fielding of a third exper-
iment to explore how risk preferences might vary as a function of BAC. We found
gender-specific effects: Men did not exhibit variations in risk preferences across
BACs. In contrast, women were more risk averse than men at low BACs but exhib-
ited increasing tolerance towards risks as BAC increased. Based on our estimates,
men and women’s risk preferences are predicted to be identical at BACs nearly twice
the legal limit for driving. We discuss the implications for policy-makers.
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Many kinds of economically and personally impactful decisions are made by individ-
uals under the influence of alcohol: choices about additional alcohol consumption;
choices about gambling strategies;1 choices about sexual partners; choices about
whether or not to get behind the wheel of a car. Consider, for example, some of the
economic and personal consequences associated with drunk driving: In 1997 more
than 1.4 million driving while intoxicated (DWI) citations were issued. It is also dif-
ficult to estimate the individual economic impact of DWI citations but some studies
suggest that it is as high as $40,000.2 In 2004 39% of the 42,800 traffic fatalities
involved alcohol.3 Or consider the raw economic impact of alcohol: In 2009 some
572 million gallons of (pure) ethanol were consumed in the U.S.,4 resulting in nearly
$100 billion in real (off-premises) sales.5 And if our measurements are representative
of blood alcohol levels experienced by most people making choices about alcohol
consumption, Americans make at least $90 billion of alcohol consumption decisions
at non-zero blood alcohol concentrations (BACs).6
The consequences with regard to health and safety costs relating to alcohol con-
sumption, to examine another domain, are serious enough that they have led to the
development of numerous public policies intended to shape the behavior of individu-
als intoxicated by alcohol: For example, all 50 U.S. states prohibit the sale of alcohol
to intoxicated individuals. This suggests a conviction by some policy-makers that
intoxicated individuals lie beyond the pale of rational incentive structures.7 Twenty-
seven states have some form of time-dependent price-controls on the sale of alcohol
at bars (i.e. the prohibition of “happy hours” or “ladies nights”), suggesting a con-
viction that intoxicated decision-makers are sensitive to incentives but in different
ways at different levels of intoxication.8 But is there an economic rationale for these
policies? Are policies which preclude drunk people from purchasing additional alco-
hol really based on the idea that intoxicated humans will not respond to incentives
in a rational manner? Is there evidence that choice consistency is in fact dramati-
cally compromised when blood alcohol levels are elevated? Are policies aimed at
modifying the risky-behavior of individuals intoxicated by alcohol making the oppo-
site assumption? For example, do additional sentencing penalties for drunk drivers
1Casinos commonly provide complimentary alcohol to individuals seated at gaming tables.
2Most recently available data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content.../pub/
pdf/dwiocs.pdf
3National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: http://www.nhtsa.gov/Research/Human+Factors/
Alcohol+Impairment
4National Institute for Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Statistical Tables: http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/
publications/Surveillance92/CONS09.pdf
5National Income and Product Accounts table 2.4: http://www.bea.gov/national/consumer spending.htm
6This number is likely a dramatic underestimate of the total dollar value of risky choices made while
intoxicated. For example, we cannot find data on the amount of alcohol sold each year at bars, a large
proportion of which is sold to individuals with non-zero BACs. And these are but a limited class of risky
decisions made by intoxicated individuals.
7We should note, however, that these laws rarely appear to be enforced which may reflect any number of
considerations with regard to this apparent conviction.
8Both of these statistics come from the NHTSA 2005 research report titled “Preventing Over-consumption
of Alcohol - Sales to the Intoxicated and “Happy Hour” (Drink Special) Laws.”
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with high blood alcohol concentrations suggest a conviction that risk-attitudes change
when BACs are high? Economic analysis can model risky choices made under the
influence and inform these policies if sufficient data are available. But in order to do
so, economists must first empirically investigate some basic questions about how the
choices of individuals can be affected by alcohol.
Over the course of the last several decades, economists have addressed these
issues by developing a number of highly influential theoretical models that predict
and explain these behaviors as well as specifying interventional strategies. Foremost
among these is the Becker and Murphy (1988) model of rational addiction. In that
model, consumers of addictive drugs are proposed to behave as traditional expected
utility maximizers, but with an innovative notion of “addictive capital.” A number
of both variants of the Becker and Murphy model and counter-proposals have been
developed, but nearly all share the quality that choosers are viewed as normatively
rational expected utility maximizers. All of these rational choice models make clear
statements about interventional policies, but perhaps surprisingly very few of the
behavioral assumptions of these models have been empirically validated. This paper
is the first step towards testing this class of model with experimental tools in an
ecologically valid field environment — an American bar.
The natural starting point toward any choice-based assessment of the behavior of
drunk people with regard to existing models of intoxicant-related behavior is to deter-
mine whether choosers really do behave rationally while they are under the influence.
So we begin our field study with tests of whether the choices of drunk people are
consistent with utility maximization, a central assumption maintained by this class
of model. We do this by assessing whether blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is
related to violations of the generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP). The
generalized axiom is a necessary and sufficient condition for utility maximization.
So systematic and widespread failures of GARP observed in drunk choosers would
be enormously informative. In addition to suggesting that formal economic analyses
of the behavior of drunk people would then be impossible, such a finding would lend
significant economic credibility to bans on alcohol purchases by the intoxicated —
bans challenged by rational choice models of these choosers. If drunk choosers are
wildly inconsistent in their choice behavior, then incentive structures aimed at reduc-
ing everything from highway fatalities to teenage pregnancies must respect this fact.
Our data, however, suggest that there is no meaningful relationship between mea-
sured BAC and choice consistency as measured by GARP, a finding which supports
this general class of model.9
Next, given the prevalence of risky choices (and policies aimed at shaping the
risky choices) made by intoxicated individuals, we turn our attention to the baseline
economic model of choices over risk employed by these models: expected utility. We
investigate whether the choices of drunk people can be consistent with the expected
utility (EU) hypothesis by examining violations of the independence axiom, a critical
9Although, as reported and discussed in the online Appendix A (available on the author’s web site http://
www.decisionsrus.com/documents/Appendix JRU.pdf), we find potential, but very weak, evidence for a
minuscule female-specific effect on adherence to GARP at very high BACs.
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representational condition for EU-maximization, and then explore how BAC changes
risk preferences. Systematic violations of the independence axiom (IA) by drunken
choosers would raise serious questions about applying the baseline EU model to
the risky choices of drunk people and much more critically would raise the ques-
tion of whether or not these choosers would respond to probabilistic incentives in a
consistent manner. For the independence axiom our results are less clear-cut: Intox-
icated individuals make more violations of independence in our experiment but the
magnitude of this difference is quite small. An average agent in our sample who
goes from a BAC of 0.000% (sober) to a BAC of 0.100% (a level well above the
legal limit for driving in most U.S. states) would just be beginning to show an eco-
nomically detectable increase in the frequency/likelihood of additional violations of
independence. Thus, while even the sober participants in our experiments cannot be
considered perfect EU-maximizers (an observation consistent with many previous
reports), we conclude that for most commonly experienced BACs, alcohol does not
significantly impair the applicability of the baseline EU model. This result is signif-
icant because it indicates, in broad strokes, that even subjects with high BACs are
sensitive to risk and it is this kind of sensitivity that is required for many classes of
incentive structures to be effective.
Finally, with the observation that drunk choosers can both be seen as consis-
tent and sensitive to risk, we turn our attention to examining how risk preferences
themselves might be affected by BAC (in our population). The critical insight
here is that policies aimed at modifying the behavior of drunk people could have
unintended consequences if the risk preferences of drunk individuals deviate signif-
icantly from those of sober agents. For example, consider the possibility that drunk
people could be generally risk loving while the same people are risk averse when
sober. In that case, policies aimed at changing the risk-profile of drunken deci-
sion making could, counterintuitively, result in increases in risky behavior. Thus,
we conduct a third experiment intended to measure risk aversion. We calibrate
random utility models with a systematically varying constant relative risk aver-
sion (CRRA) utility (Bernoulli) function and we find evidence for gender-specific
changes in risk preferences across BAC. On average, we found men to be more risk-
tolerant than women (consistent with previous findings in the experimental literature;
Eckel and Grossman (2008); Croson and Gneezy (2009)) and (perhaps surprisingly)
we found that risk preferences in men showed little variation as a function of BAC.
In contrast, we found that risk-aversion in women declined as a function of BAC in
such a way that the risk preferences of intoxicated men and women are predicted
to be identical at BACs of about 0.150%, nearly twice the legal limit for driving.
These results suggest that policies aimed specifically at modifying the risky behav-
ior of intoxicated individuals might be less effective for women than predicted with
estimates based on their behavior while sober (or estimates based on the behavior of
men) and this suggests, from a policy level, that traditional incentive structures may
have more effect on male than on female drinkers.
To develop these points, this paper is divided into six sections. The next section
explores the connections of our research to literatures in economics, psychology, and
physiology. Section 2 details our sampling and measurement designs. The subsequent
three sections discuss our experiments designed to assay adherence to (i) GARP and
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(ii) IA, and (iii) to measure risk preferences. The final section discusses our results
and suggests some directions for future research.
1 Background
Our paper has two broad research foci. The first focus is whether BAC can compro-
mise choice consistency. The second focus is whether either consistency with regard
to risk and risk attitudes varies with BAC. These two foci have connections to sev-
eral literatures. We begin first by discussing how these foci are related to some extant
theoretical and empirical work in the economic literature, and then to the physiology
and psychology literatures.
Both of our research foci have strong connections to the rational addiction lit-
erature pioneered by Becker and Murphy (1988). Becker and Murphy argued that
drug users could be viewed as consistent, that they respond to traditional incentive
mechanisms when they are under the influence. Recently, Bernheim and Rangel
(2004) challenged this view, at least in part, by suggesting that while choosers may
behave in a locally consistent fashion, meaningful differences in preferences might
arise across states of intoxication. Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) have explored a
related model intended to capture the features of a “harmful” addiction. Their work
distinguishes between compulsive and non-compulsive consumption in a consistent
framework and assesses both price sensitivity and welfare under these assumptions.
The Bernheim and Rangel (2004) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) models and others
like them in the literature (Benhabib and Bisin 2005; Fudenberg and Levine 2006),
explicitly assume that within each of the possible states a chooser can experience,
their choices are consistent (i.e. that choices adhere to GARP, when one can assume
the existence of Walrasian budgets). Thus, for these classes of models choosers are
1) assumed to be rational and consistent at any given blood level of an addictive
substance and 2) that the preferences of these agents are a function of addictive
substance blood level.10 Oddly, despite wide discussion of these models, and the
fact that meaningful policy implications are drawn from them, neither the sensitivity
of state-specific rationality to drug consumption, nor whether preferences change
across states in such a way that would induce apparent global inconsistencies,
appears to have been the subject of any behavioral test whatsoever for any drug
of abuse. Here we begin to contribute to this literature by offering empirical data
bearing on the assumptions made in these models.
Our experiments and results can also inform the extensive literature that empir-
ically investigates how policies can shape risky behaviors related to alcohol (e.g.
drunk driving and demand for alcoholic beverages).11 A recent exemplar of work in
this area that could be informed by our experiments is Jackson and Owens (2011)
who find that for exogenous changes in Washington D.C. train schedules, DWI arrests
10Note that our empirical strategy is to measure BAC and use it as a continuously varying proxy for what
these classes of models typically assume are discrete states.
11Cook (2007) provides an excellent summary of this vast literature.
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and fatal traffic accidents decline in geographic areas that are within walking dis-
tance of transit stations. However, what is unclear from that report is whether this
finding is principally due to drinkers using behavioral strategies for pre-commitment
that are employed while sober (i.e. leaving the car at home before a night out drink-
ing) or, whether individuals optimize over transportation choices once intoxicated.
That we find intoxicated individuals are weakly consistent with the EU-maximization
hypothesis indicates that the latter remains a plausible explanation. Of course for a
policy-maker this leaves open the possibility that policies aimed specifically at the
population of individuals acutely intoxicated by alcohol could be as efficient as poli-
cies aimed at encouraging pre-commitment if those policies respected empirically
observed preference structures of intoxicated choosers.
That individuals intoxicated by alcohol remain rational in their choosing may also
have some potential implications for law, particularly with regard to consequentialist
approaches. In some states, high blood levels of alcohol can mitigate a defendant’s
culpability for violent actions. Were high blood alcohol levels to be associated with
decreased rationality, then one might argue that both the consequentialist and deon-
tological legal approaches would support such a view. But if the intoxicated are
both consistent and risk-sensitive, then consequentialist considerations (at the very
least) would argue against the notion that high BACs should mitigate culpability and
punishment.
Our experiments can also be informative for questions about whether economic
experiments conducted in lab settings are consistent with results from the field (Levitt
and List 2007; Camerer 2011) because, where possible, we adapted previously pub-
lished and validated experimental designs to assess our hypotheses. The experiment
we used to assay adherence to GARP is adapted from the design used by Harbaugh
et al. (2001) to examine the relationship between age and violations of GARP.12 Our
experiment to measure risk preferences was adapted from the design of Holt and
Laury (2002) and Holt and Laury (2005). Our approach to the independence axiom
was more novel (which is the result of institutional constraints and a desire to be con-
sistent across probability and prize spaces between our two experiments with money
lotteries) but respects the fact that it is often violated, even by trained economists
(Allais 1953; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Wu 1994; Wu and Gonzales 1998; Prelec
1998).13 Because we use previously published and validated laboratory experiments,
this permits us the opportunity to place our findings from the field setting into the
context of previously published, lab-based results. The results from our experiments,
discussed in the respective experimental sections below, are quite similar with those
found in lab settings which would be consistent with the view that findings from
laboratory experiments can be representative of choices made in the field (Camerer
2011). This result seems especially striking given that our samples are principally
12While the budgets we employ come from the Harbaugh et al. (2001) design, we use computer-based
graphically presented bundles similar to the mechanism employed by Choi et al. (2007). At a more proce-
dural level, we took extensive pains to limit stereotyped choice behaviors, like corner solving, which limit
the power of some studies that use these approaches.
13Three excellent reviews of this literature are Cox and Harrison (2008), chapters 10 and 11 in Glimcher
et al. (2009), and Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
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comprised of individuals that have non-zero BACs, many of which are too drunk to
legally drive.
While examining the acute effects that drugs of abuse have on choice behavior
has been rare in the economics literature,14 the psychological and medical literatures
have carefully explored how alcohol intoxication can affect behavior. But these liter-
atures do not focus on economic concepts such as consistency and preferences which
lie at the heart of every economic model. One example of this is the psychologi-
cal hypothesis that elevated BACs induce what is called “alcohol myopia” (Steele
and Josephs 1990). This theory posits that alcohol intoxication makes reactions to
prominent stimuli more extreme. An example of risky choice data consistent with
this psychological theory is discussed by MacDonald et al. (2000). MacDonald inter-
prets this theory as accounting for intoxicated individuals’ stated intentions to engage
in unprotected (risky) sex at a higher level. That there is a large body of evidence
consistent with the theory of alcohol myopia suggests some potential cautions when
interpreting our experimental results. It could certainly be the case that the particular
presentation of stimuli in our experiments creates more or less consistency, or drives
risk preferences in a specific direction, an issue that has been explored extensively in
the decision-making literature for the risky choices of sober individuals (Moskowitz
1974; Keller 1985).
While most of the investigations in the physiology and psychology literatures
tend to focus on behaviors relating to information processing, motor performance,
aggression, and social interactions, several of these studies have explored how risky
choices are influenced by alcohol, although with techniques that differ from those
that would be undertaken by economists. An example of such a study is Lane et al.
(2004). In that report, the number of times a subject selects a lottery that has a lower
expected value than a degenerate, reference lottery increases with alcohol adminis-
tration. While from an economic perspective the design and analysis of that study can
make it difficult to disentangle learning and wealth effects from risk preferences, it is
consistent with the picture painted by studies such as Fromme et al. (1997) and Lane
et al. (2008)15 that implicate alcohol in lowering inhibitions, which is hypothesized
to result in increases in risk taking.
Using this extensive work from psychology and physiology as motivation we
pursue economic questions aimed both at theoretical implications and relevance to
policy: We employ traditional economic tools to examine how the theoretical repre-
sentation of choices is related to BAC. With evidence in hand that drunk individuals
are (weakly) consistent with an EU representation, we proceed naturally toward
assessing whether Arrow-Pratt risk aversion varies with BAC. While institutional
constraints mandated that we employ a between-subjects approach to our questions,
our data can speak clearly to the behavior of agents in economically significant
settings.
14Two counter-examples are Kagel et al. (1980), which explores the relationship between work perfor-
mance and marijuana consumption, and Krishnamurti et al. (2011) which explores the choices of drunk
people in the ultimatum game.
15This study administers a benzodiazepene agonist which shares the same principal pharmacological
mechanism as alcohol.
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2 Experimental methods
All experimental participants provided verbal informed consent after reading a con-
sent document as approved by NYU’s Institutional Review Board. Our consent
procedure did not permit signing of a consent form, so as to guarantee the anonymity
of participants. Each participant was, however, required to correctly answer four out
of five questions about the consent document before they could participate in the
experiment.16
After obtaining consent, each participant went through a computerized (E-Prime
1.2; Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, PA) practice and instructional ses-
sion (5-10 minutes) that detailed the objects of choice and the incentive-compatible
payment mechanism. This instructional session was followed immediately by the
computerized decision-making portion of the experiment.
Each of the choice-situations in the three experiments were presented one-at-
a-time and in random order. At the conclusion of the experiment one choice-
situation was selected randomly to be realized for payment. The experimental
software randomly selected the choice-situation, and indicated the participant’s
choice. If a non-degenerate lottery was selected the uncertainty was resolved using
either a 100-sided die or a 10-sided die, as required. Participants then provided
a breathalyzer reading, received their incentive-compatible payment, and signed
a receipt.17
BAC was measured with an AlcoHawk PT500 (Q3 Innovations LLC, Indepen-
dence, IA) which estimates BAC by measuring breath alcohol concentration.18 This
meter provides U.S. Department of Transportation precision (±0.002% BAC) and
is analytically identical to breath alcohol meters used by law enforcement agents.19
All participants were provided with a new, sterile breathalyzer mouthpiece that was
discarded after use.
2.1 Sampling
All experimental participants were recruited between 8 p.m. and 1 a.m. (the following
morning) on Tuesdays or Wednesdays from a population of customers at a bar in
Manhattan’s Lower East Side neighborhood. These times were employed because (i)
it was easier to explain the instructions to participants when the bar was less crowded
and (ii) because the bar permitted us to recruit participants from among their patrons
on these days.
16Only two out of 321 potential participants failed this test.
17Participants were informed during the instructional phase of the experiment that they would need to sign
a receipt for their payment but that their signature did not need to be legible.
18An amount constantly proportional to blood alcohol concentration (over a range of BAC up to 0.400%)
is exhaled with each breath (O’Daire 2009)
19The difference between our breathalyzer and ones used by law enforcement agents for evidentiary testing
is that our breathalyzer has no memory nor can it be attached to a printer.
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2.2 Physiology, females, and blood alcohol concentration
A given level of ingested alcohol is known to result in different blood alcohol concen-
trations for different people and the factors that can affect this are numerous: body
weight, proportion of lean body mass, hydration level, time since last meal, con-
tent of previous meal, genetic pre-disposition toward levels of alcohol dehydrogenase
(the enzyme used to metabolize alcohol in vivo), and recent (48-hour) drinking his-
tory (Meyer and Quenzer 2005; Iversen et al. 2009). Table 1 details estimated blood
alcohol concentrations for both men and women for a range of ingested alcohol and
body weights and Table 2 details the physiological effects of various blood alcohol
concentrations for both sexes.
Close examination of Table 1 reveals that for the same body-weight and amount
of ingested alcohol, women tend to exhibit higher BACs. The explanations for this
phenomenon are (i) conditional on body weight, women tend to have less lean-body
mass than men and alcohol is more readily absorbed by bodies with less lean-body
mass (Meyer and Quenzer 2005). And (ii) women generally exhibit lower levels of
alcohol dehydrogenase (Meyer and Quenzer 2005; Iversen et al. 2009).
Across all three of our experiments, female participants exhibited higher aver-
age blood alcohol concentrations than male participants. The explanation for this
doubtless rests on the differences between female and male physiology detailed
above (in addition to the observation that women tend to weigh less than men in
samples like ours), combined with social norms related to drinking at bars: Peo-
ple tend to go to a bar in groups and to imbibe roughly the same total amount
of alcohol. The resultant positive relationship between gender and BAC is an
important consideration as we use statistical tools to assess potential relationships
Table 1 Estimated blood alcohol concentrations (Male/Female;%)
Standard Body weight in pounds
drinks
100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
1 .04/.05 .03/04 .02/.03 .02/.03 .02/.03 .02/.02 .02/.02 .02/.02
2 .08/.09 .06/.08 .05/.07 .05/.06 .04/.05 .04/.05 .03/.04 .03/.04
3 .11/.14 .09/.11 .08/.10 .07/.09 .06/.08 .06/.07 .05/.06 .05/.06
4 .15/.18 .12/.15 .11/.13 .09/.11 .08/.10 .08/.09 .07/.08 .06/.08
5 .19/.23 .16/.19 .13/.16 .12/.14 .11/.13 .09/.11 .09/.10 .08/.09
6 .23/.27 .19/.23 .16/.19 .14/.17 .13/.15 .11/.14 .10/.12 .09/.11
7 .26/.32 .22/.27 .19/.23 .16/.20 .15/.18 .13/.16 .12/.14 .11/.13
8 .30/.36 .25/.30 .21/.26 .19/.23 .17/.20 .15/.18 .14/.17 .13/.15
9 .34/.41 .28/.34 .24/.29 .21/.26 .19/.23 .17/.20 .15/.19 .14/.17
10 .38/.45 .31/.38 .27/.32 .23/.28 .21/.25 .19/.23 .17/.21 .16/.19
One standard drink is 1.25 oz. of 80 proof liquor, 12 oz. beer, or 5 oz. wine
This is a reproduction of Table 9.1 in Meyer and Quenzer (2005)
224 J Risk Uncertain (2013) 46:215–246
Table 2 Blood alcohol concentration and effects on behavior
BAC (%) Behavior
.02 − .03 Minimal effects; slight relaxation; mild mood elevation
.05 − .06 Decreased alertness; relaxed inhibitions; mildly impaired judgement
.08 − .10 Loss of motor coordination; slower reaction times; less caution
.14 − .16 Major impairment of mental and physical control; slurred speech;
exaggerated emotions; blurred vision; serious loss of judgement;
large increases in reaction time
.20 − .25 Staggering; inability to walk or dress without help; tears or rage with
little provocation; mental confusion; double vision
.30 Conscious but in a stupor; unaware of surroundings
.45 Coma; lethal for 50% of the population
This is a reproduction of Table 9.2 in Meyer and Quenzer (2005)
between BAC, GARP violations, independence axiom violations, and risk prefer-
ences: omitting a variable that is correlated with an included variable can result
in biased parameter estimates. To address this concern we therefore included in
all of our statistical estimations a binary variable indicating the gender of the
participant.
3 GARP experiment
Does alcohol intoxication compromise individual responses to incentives? To assess
whether intoxicated individuals will respond to incentives we employ traditional
economic reasoning by testing whether the choices of drunk people adhere to the
generalized axiom of revealed preference at rates similar to sober individuals. The
generalized axiom provides a convenient way to examine this question because it
generates testable conditions on economic observables (prices and demands). In
addition, the sensitivity of GARP to alcohol intoxication has never previously been
explored.
Our experiment designed to assay adherence to GARP consisted of 11 Walrasian
budgets such as those depicted in Fig. 1a through d. Each of the choice-situations
involved explicit tradeoffs between two types of food items served at the bar. Figure 2
displays two different screen shots from the experimental software. Figure 2a depicts
the alternatives in the shallow budget in Fig. 1a and b, while Fig. 2b depicts the
alternatives in the steep budget in Fig. 1a and b.
The hollow circles in Fig. 1a depict a subject’s choices from those two budgets
that do not involve a cycle. In contrast, the hollow circles in Fig. 1b depict a different
set of choices which do involve a choice cycle, and thus violate GARP.
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Fig. 1 GARP violations, experimental design, and Afriat’s Efficiency Index
The full set of 11 Walrasian budgets is depicted in Fig. 1c. The choice options
available appear as dots in the figure and include all the integer bundles of goods
available from the 11 budgets. This set of budgets is identical to those used by
Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002) to assess the transitivity of
children’s choices for food/drink items, and the transitivity of choices in the Dictator
Game.20
3.1 Sample
Table 3 reports summary statistics for participants in the GARP experiment. This
sample is comprised of 101 individuals: 55 men and 46 women, at an average BAC
20Table 14 in the online Appendix A (available on the author’s web site http://www.decisionsrus.com/
documents/Appendix JRU.pdf) describes all of the budget details (prices and wealth levels).
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Fig. 2 Two screen shots from the GARP experiment
of 0.062% and 0.066%, respectively. There is no statistically significant difference
in average BACs observed between men and women in this sample. Figure 3 depicts
the cumulative sample distributions of BAC for both men (crosses) and women (tri-
angles). As manifested by the uniform slope of this cumulative sample distribution
function between BACs of 0.020% and 0.125%, our GARP sample includes a fairly
uniform distribution.
3.2 Measures
Adherence to the Generalized Axiom is discrete: subjects either adhere to GARP
or they do not. And, while it may be illustrative to consider how strict adherence
to GARP is related to BAC, a more typical approach is to determine the “sever-
ity” of observed violations. When choices are made over Walrasian budgets, one
classic measure of severity is Afriat’s Efficiency Index (Afriat 1967; Varian 1982).
Afriat’s Efficiency Index (AEI) is the proportional distance that a Walrasian budget
must be moved back toward the origin to absorb an observed transitivity violation.
Figure 1d provides a graphical depiction: the choices (indicated by the hollow cir-
cles) violate GARP. The budget line would have to be shifted to the dashed line in (d)
to completely absorb this violation. For Walrasian budgets, the value of (1 − AEI)
can thus be interpreted as the proportion of a chooser’s wealth wasted through cycles.
An alternative measure of GARP violation severity is the Houtman-Maks (HM)
index (Houtman and Maks 1985; Choi et al. 2007). HM is defined as the largest
subset of all observed choices that do not include any cycles. HM has the benefit that
it is more general than AEI: calculating HM does not require Walrasian budgets.
Table 3 GARP sample BAC characteristics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 55 0.062 0.039 0.000 0.16
Female 46 0.066 0.047 0.000 0.200
Total 101 0.064 0.043 0.000 0.200
All numbers (except sample sizes) are % BAC
J Risk Uncertain (2013) 46:215–246 227
0
.2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 S
am
pl
e 
Di
st
rib
ut
io
n
0 .05 .10 .15 .20
Blood Alcohol Concentration (%)
Male Female
Fig. 3 GARP sample BAC cumulative distributions. The solid vertical line depicts 0.080% BAC, the legal
driving limit in many U.S. states
However, unlike the AEI, HM equally penalizes both “small” and “large” viola-
tions of GARP. For example, consider a set of 11 choices in which the AEI is 0.99
and the HM is 10. Only one of the choices represents a departure from adherence
to GARP. However, the size of this violation is small because the chooser wastes
only 1% of her wealth through this offending choice. In contrast, consider a set of
11 choices in which the AEI is 0.87 and the HM is again 10. As in the previous case
only one choice violates GARP but the severity of that violation is quite large. For
this reason we consider both the AEI and HM as dependent measures in our analyses
although we relegate the analyses of HM to the online Appendix A, available from
the author’s web site, for editorial brevity and because the qualitative findings are the
same for both measures.
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Dependent variable: Afriat’s Efficiency Index
The scatter plot in Fig. 4a shows all of the AEI-BAC pairs of data for our sample
which suggest little correlation even at surprisingly high BACs. Table 4 confirms
this: of our 101 participants 82.2% have Afriat Indices of at least 0.999. The aver-
age AEI across all BAC levels is 0.967 which is similar to the average AEIs reported
by Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Andreoni and Miller (2002).21 Our average AEIs also
lie within the marginal distribution of AEIs reported by Choi et al. (2007) who use a
21Harbaugh et al. (2001) report average AEIs of 0.93, 0.96, and 0.94 in their populations of students in
second-grade, sixth-grade, and undergraduate classrooms. Andreoni and Miller (2002) report that only
four of their 176 undergraduate subjects had AEIs less than unity which, based on our calculations from
their Table II, gives an average AEI of 0.998.
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Fig. 4 Afriat’s Efficiency Index and blood alcohol concentration. The solid vertical line depicts 0.080%
BAC, the legal driving limit in many U.S. states
different experimental design. Our average AEIs are also similar to the results
reported by Sippel (1997).22
When we estimate models of the form,
AEIi = β0 + β1BACi + β21(F emale)i + i (1)
where AEI is indexed by subject (i), BACi is measured blood alcohol concentra-
tion, and 1(F emale)i is an indicator variable for sex, we do not find any statistically
significant relationship between AEI and BAC across the range of BACs we mea-
sured. Also included in these models, but not reported in Table 5, are a set of control
variables that capture which food-pairing, of the six possible combinations, the
subject selected.
Models (1) through (4) in Table 5 report results from Tobit estimations with an
upper limit of unity. The difference between models (1) and (2) (and models (3) and
(4)) is the exclusion/inclusion of food-pairing controls in the estimating specification.
The difference between models (1)/(2) and (3)/(4) are the exclusion of the two AEI
outliers visible in the lower portion of panel (a) in Fig. 4: The two subjects with
AEIs below the level of a simulated random chooser (AEI < 0.675; see Harbaugh
et al. (2001)) are dropped from the estimating sample in models (3), (4), and (5).
The lack of variation in AEIi makes the Tobit results in Models (1) through (4)
reported in Table 5 somewhat questionable: The positive, maximal log likelihood
values suggest that our ability to identify parameter estimates is especially dubious.
Model (5) employs ordinary least squares (OLS) as an identification mechanism and
includes controls for food-pairings and excludes the two subjects with AEIi < 0.675
with no change in qualitative results: There thus does not appear to be a statistically
significant relationship between BAC and AEI over the range of BACs and the
22Although Sippel (1997) reports the proportions of his two samples (1/12 and 3/30) above an AEI thresh-
old of 0.950. As can be inferred from Table IV, we find a slightly smaller proportion of our sample to have
AEIs above that threshold.
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Table 4 Afriat’s Efficiency Index and blood alcohol concentration
Afriat’s Efficiency Index N Avg. BAC Std. Dev.
1.00 59 .060 .039
0.999 24 .067 .049
0.888 2 .069 .050
0.875 10 .092 .049
0.833 2 .02 .010
0.75 2 .078 .043
0.50 2 .035 .008
0.967a 101 .064a .043a
aSample averages
choice sets we examined. In addition, the magnitude of these statistically insignif-
icant parameter estimates is economically meaningless. Consider, for example, the
parameter estimate for BAC in Model (5) of Table 5 and a representative Male sub-
ject who starts out sober (BAC = 0.000%) with an AEI of 1.00. Our data suggest
that this representative subject would need to arrive at a BAC of 0.650% to reduce
his AEI to 0.95 on our choice sets, a commonly-used threshold to declare a chooser
as “irrational.” We note that this BAC would be lethal for the representative agent
(see Table 2). The results that emerge from these regressions (and for analyses of the
Table 5 Regressions demonstrating no relationship between Afriat’s Efficiency Index (AEI) and Blood
Alcohol Concentration (BAC)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
BAC −0.118 0.102 −0.290 −0.153 −0.077
(0.332) (0.320) (0.244) (0.232) (0.121)
Female −0.086∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗ −0.020∗
(0.037) (0.031) (0.024) (0.023) (0.011)
Constant 1.101∗∗∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 1.084∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 1.005∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.049) (0.027) (0.036) (0.011)
Est. type Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit OLS
Number Obs. 101 101 99 99 99
Censored Obs. 59 59 59 59 N.A.
Log likelihood −12.0 −7.4 4.7 6.7 –
Pseudo R2/R2 0.197 0.508 Not Def. Not Def. 0.114
Food controls No Yes No Yes Yes
Excl. Crit. N.A. N.A. AEIi ≤ 0.675 AEIi ≤ 0.675 AEIi ≤ 0.675
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted ∗∗∗, 5% as ∗∗, 10% as ∗
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Houtman-Maks measure, reported in the online Appendix A) indicate that alcohol
does not appear to statistically or economically compromise response to incentives
in our population, for the BACs we observe.
4 Independence experiment
With the observation that choosers with extremely high BACs will, at a very basic
level, respond to incentives, we turn our attention to assessing how alcohol might
compromise response to incentives with an element of risk. We ask whether the risky
choices made by drunk people can be consistent with the baseline economic model
of choices that involve known probabilities: expected utility. The critical feature of
choices that would respond in a manner consistent with EU would be adherence to
the independence axiom at similar rates across a wide range of BACs. Thus, we
fielded an experiment designed to assay adherence to the independence axiom.23
This experiment presented participants with 45 choice-situations in the form of visu-
ally displayed monetary lotteries. As shown in screen shots from our experimental
software in Fig. 5a and c, each choice-situation involved a decision between a certain
$30 and a “lottery” with three possible prizes.24 Each alternative in the experiment
was presented graphically with probabilities proportional to the areas of a vertically
oriented rectangle. The prizes were also represented by unique colors.25 In addition,
all prize and probability information was presented numerically “on top” of these
graphical displays.
Our experiment includes 30 choice-situations designed to assay adherence to the
independence axiom and these 15 choice-situation-pairs (CSPs) were all designed
in a similar way: each of these choice-situations include a lottery in which the three
possible prizes are less than, equal to, and greater than $30. Adopting the notation
that L is the certain $30 and L′ is the lottery, all of our choice-situation-pairs (C1, C2)
take the following form:
• Choice-situation C1: {L,L′}
• Choice-situation C2: {L,L′′} where L′′ = ( 12 )L′ + ( 12 )L
Graphically, there are two ways to depict the constructions of these CSPs. The first
is through a “re-shuffling” of the probabilistic masses attached to each of the prizes.
23Technically our experiment tests for violations of a slightly weaker condition: Betweenness (Dekel 1986;
Camerer and Ho 1994). However, because betweenness is a necessary condition for independence, to any
extent that our empirical results suggest failures of betweenness, they also imply failures of independence
although of course the reverse is not necessarily the case. However, because our experimental design
employed three-state lotteries, any true test of independence (as opposed to betweenness) would greatly
increase the complexity of the choice-situations: subjects would need to compare two three-state lotteries
instead of one degenerate and one three-state lottery. For this reason we adopted the test of betweenness
described here to examine the stability of the independence axiom.
24Henceforth, we use the term “lottery” to refer to the non-certain option for brevity.
25For a complete description of the unique colors and prize values used in this experiment see the online
Appendix B, available on the author’s web site http://www.decisionsrus.com/documents/Appendix JRU.
pdf
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Fig. 5 Construction of choice-situation-pairs. The choice-situation-pair, {C1, C2}, can be used to test the
independence axiom
Consider Fig. 5a which represents a choice between $30 for sure and a lottery L′ =
(0.70, 0.10, 0.20) over the prize space Z = {$40, $30, $20}. To produce a choice-
situation that can be used to assay adherence to IA, we split in half the probabilistic
masses associated with the $40 and $20 prizes and place them on the $30 prize:
L′′ = 12 (0.70, 0.10, 0.20) + 12 (0, 1.00, 0). The result is the choice-situation depicted
in Fig. 5c. The choice-situation-pair in Fig. 5a and c can be used to test for violations
of IA.
An alternative way to depict our choice-situation-pairs is with a unit simplex. As
shown in panels (a) through (d) of Fig. 6 the unit simplex is a two-dimensional depic-
tion of the plane x + y + z = 1 in R3+, from the perspective along the ray (1, 1, 1).
Any point in the simplex is a (two-dimensional) representation of a probability distri-
bution over the three prizes at the vertices of the simplex. Figure 6a depicts the lottery
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Fig. 6 Construction of choice-situation-pairs. The choice-situation-pair, {C1, C2}, can be used to test the
independence axiom
L∗ =
(
1
3 ,
1
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1
3
)
which corresponds to the centroid of the unit-simplex. Depicted in
Fig. 6b is a set of three lotteries, L,L′, and L′′. Note that L′′ is the convex combi-
nation of L and L′ with α = 12 . As shown in Fig. 6c and d these lotteries can be
organized as two choice-situations, C1, and C2 that can be used to test for violations
of IA. Specifically, if L′ ∗ L, the independence axiom requires that L′′ ∗ L. If,
however, the lottery L was selected over L′′ (when L′ was also selected over L) this
would be a violation of IA.
Our experiment also includes a set of 15 ancillary choice-situations: five in which
the lottery first-order stochastically dominates the certain $30, five in which the lot-
tery is first-order stochastically dominated by the $30, and five in which the lottery
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is second-order stochastically dominated by the certain $30. These ancillary choice-
situations are used primarily as a screening device in our analyses as described
below.
A final experimental design criterion was to avoid sampling very low and very
high probability prizes where violations of IA consistently arise even in sober
individuals (Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Prelec 1998): All the lotteries in our
experiment do not include probabilities that were lower than 10% or higher than
90%. We avoided lotteries near the edges of the simplex for two principal reasons:
First, we wanted the probability spaces to be consistent between our indepen-
dence and risk experiments. Second, because the maximum payout we could offer
subjects was $100 and for such limited prize amounts the marginal changes in
lottery EVs (within a CSP) for low probability events is relatively small. Con-
sider, for example, a lottery L′ with a probability of winning $100 of 0.06. For
the way we constructed our CSPs a lottery L′′ would have an expected value that
is decreased by at most $3 (it would be less than this given the construction of
our lotteries). In the event we observed an independence axiom violation (IAV) in
this CSP it could be difficult to interpret this as a “strict” IAV; indifference could
be a reasonable alternative interpretation. On the other hand, consider a lottery
that is consistent with our design criteria: L′ has a probability of winning $100 of
0.20 which would imply that L′′ has that prize’s probability at 0.10. This implies
that EV could change by at most $10. Interpreting any inconsistency in this CSP
as a “strict” IAV seemed more justifiable than with lotteries that included small
probabilities.
4.1 Sample
The sample for our independence experiment is comprised of 104 individuals, 44
of whom are male (42.3%) and 60 of whom are female (57.7%). As reported in
Table 6 the average BAC of these sub-samples was 0.057% for men and 0.079% for
women. This difference in average BACs is the largest amongst our three samples and
represents a statistically significant difference when using a t-test (at 1% confidence).
The male and female subsamples do, however, show uniformity between measured
BAC levels of 0.020% and 0.125%, as depicted in the cumulative sample distribution
functions in Fig. 7.
Table 6 Independence sample characteristics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 44 0.057 0.039 0.000 0.133
Female 60 0.079 0.040 0.000 0.180
Total 104 0.070 0.041 0.000 0.180
All numbers (except sample sizes) are % BAC
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Fig. 7 Independence sample BAC cumulative distributions. The solid vertical line depicts 0.080% BAC,
the legal driving limit in many U.S. states
4.2 Measures
We use the number of independence axiom violations (IAVs) made in our experiment
(out of a possible 15) as a principal measure in our analyses and we relate the number
of IAVs made by a participant to their blood alcohol concentration (BAC). Figure 8
is a scatter plot of all the BAC-IAV pairs observed in the experiment. Table 7 details
the mean and median BAC for each observed IAV count.
In general, the frequency of IAVs (across all BACs) are consistent with a num-
ber of previous reports. Camerer and Ho (1994) provide an extensive summary of
previous experimental results in their Fig. 4. While making direct comparisons
between ours and those previous reports can be problematic,26 for our type of exper-
iment27 the number of individuals who make at least one violation of independence
in our experiment is potentially large.28 However, it is worth noting that our experi-
ment provides subjects with many more opportunities to violate IA than the studies
discussed there.
It is also important to note that the analyses presented in this section are not
intended to show that our measured variable ‘IAV’ reveals systematic or non-
systematic violations of independence. In fact several interpretations of any observed
variation in IAVs with BAC are possible. Consider the case in which IAVs are
increasing with BAC: It could be the case that there is an increase in the quasi-
concavity/-convexity of indifference curves (ICs) in the simplex (i.e. variation in the
26These comparisons are problematic due to differences in the number of choice-situations, prize spaces,
specific probabilities, and real vs. hypothetical choices.
27Our experiment is an example of what Camerer and Ho (1994) label as “on-border” types of tests for
independence because our choice-situations include lotteries on an edge of the simplex.
28Most studies listed in the “Gain” column of Camerer and Ho’s Fig. 4 report that, generally, about 70%
of individuals violate independence. We find that for our subjects (who made choices in 15 CSPs) nearly
all of them make some form of IAV.
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Fig. 8 Independence axiom violations and blood alcohol concentration. The solid vertical line depicts
0.080% BAC, the legal driving limit in many U.S. states
probability weighting function for a prospect theory chooser). It could also be the
case that as BAC increases choosers switch from possessing quasi-concave to quasi-
convex ICs and that the extent of the curvature is different across the two states
(so that for a prospect theory chooser their probability weighting function would be
asymmetrically reflected across the 45-degree line as BAC increased). Alternatively,
a plausible interpretation of any IAV in our experiment is that it is the result of an
“EU + error” process, a viewpoint argued for by Hey (1995) and Harless and Camerer
(1994). Given this view it could be the case that it is only the error component that is
varying with BAC.29 Indeed, this latter interpretation is well supported by additional
analyses performed in the online Appendix B in which we find no systematic changes
in the “direction” or “severity” of IAVs across BAC.30 However, our focus here is
not whether individuals have quasi-concave/-convex indifference curves versus just
make errors (most subjects appear to demonstrate one and/or the other) but instead
whether the severity of violations (as measured by the number of IAVs a specific sub-
ject makes in our experiment) is related to BAC: Dramatic changes in the frequency
of violations of independence across BAC would raise serious doubts about applying
any interpretation of the baseline EU model to the risky choices made by intoxicated
individuals.
4.3 Analysis
While it is tempting to interpret the slightly increasing trend observed in Fig. 8 and
Table 7 as evidence for a positive relationship between BAC and IAV, these reports
29We would like to thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these lines of interpretation.
30In fact we take the “increase in error rates” interpretation to a literal extreme in our modeling of risk
preferences because we allow the error dispersion parameter (κ) in our logit model to vary systematically
with BAC.
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Table 7 Independence axiom violations and BAC
Independence Number of Observations Average BAC Median BAC
Axiom violations
0 2 .036 .036
1 6 .033 .034
2 11 .056 .042
3 21 .083 .093
4 18 .059 .026
5 19 .075 .044
6 15 .064 .039
7 9 .096 .047
8 0 – –
9 2 .077 .066
10 1 .143 –
4.22a 104 .070a .041a
aSample averages
do not give us any leverage to determine whether the higher blood alcohol concen-
trations observed in females could be inducing this apparent trend. To assess whether
there is a statistically reliable relationship between BAC and IAVs we estimate
regressions of the following form:
IAVi = β0 + β1BACi + β21(F emale)i + i (2)
where the variable IAVi is the number of independence axiom violations (out of a
possible 15) that were made by participant i, the variable BACi is their measured
blood alcohol concentration, and 1(F emale)i is an indicator variable that is equal
to unity if the participant was female and zero if male. Model (1) in Table 8 reports
parameter estimates and standard errors for our full sample of 104 participants. The
parameter estimate for BAC is statistically different than zero at the 10% level when
using a two-tailed test. This level of significance is also observed when we exclude
those participants who made more violations than a random chooser would in our
experiment (i.e. IAVi > 7.5, which corresponds to Model (2) in Table 8), or when
we exclude those individuals who failed to correctly select the first order stochas-
tically dominant alternative (i.e. FOSDi < 80%, Model (3) in the Table), or both
(Model (4)).
None of the parameter estimates for BAC are significant at the traditional 5%
threshold. It can also, however, be informative to explore the economic significance
of these parameter estimates. Consider one of the large parameter estimates for BAC
in our table; the one resulting from our full sample of participants (i.e. Model (1) in
Table 8). A representative male subject who starts out sober, and at that BAC makes
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Table 8 Regressions demonstrating a weak relationship between the number of independence axiom
violations (IAVs) and Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
BAC 9.826∗ 7.582∗ 9.833∗ 8.249∗
(5.006) (4.538) (5.442) (4.914)
Female 0.727∗ 0.749∗∗ 0.664∗ 0.755∗∗
(0.375) (0.359) (0.386) (0.369)
Constant 3.118∗∗∗ 3.118∗∗∗ 2.994∗∗∗ 2.928∗∗∗
(0.444) (0.396) (0.467) (0.414)
Est. type OLS OLS OLS OLS
Number Obs. 104 101 92 90
R2 0.096 0.091 0.094 0.104
Excl. Crit.
N.A. IAVi > 7.5 FOSDi < 80% FOSDi < 80%
– – – IAVi > 7.5
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance at the 1% level is denoted ∗∗∗, 5% as ∗∗, 10% as ∗
three violations of independence, would need to imbibe enough alcohol to arrive
at a BAC of 0.102% to make one additional violation in our experiment. Although
above the legal limit for driving in the United States of America, this BAC does
lie within the bounds of our sample. At the other extreme, consider the relatively
small parameter estimate from Model (2) in Table 8. Our representative sober male
subject who made three violations of independence would need to imbibe enough
alcohol to arrive at a BAC of 0.132% to make one more violation, again a level of
intoxication that lies within our sample but is relatively high. Thus, while IAVs are
rare, it is clear that independence is more fragile than GARP with respect to BAC in
our sample. Still, one cannot help but see this glass as more than half full. Indeed,
several full glasses only marginally compromise the independence axiom, for the
average participant in our sample.
5 Risk preference experiment
The results from our independence experiment indicate that intoxicated individuals
will respond to risk-based incentives at a wide range of BACs. So how might prefer-
ences towards risks change as a function of blood alcohol? To address this question
we use an experiment to measure risk aversion. The lotteries in our experiment are
motivated by the design of Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) in their studies of risk
aversion and incentive effects: we present subjects with a pair of lotteries that have
two possible prizes and identical probability distributions. As depicted by the exper-
imental screen-shots in Fig. 9a through d these choice-situations include a “safe”
alternative (the lottery in which the prizes amounts are closer together) and a “risky”
alternative (the lottery in which the two prize amounts are farther apart).
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Choice-Situation 1a b
c d
$77 10%
$2 90%
$40 10%
$32 90%
Next 
Choice-Situation 2
$77 20%
$2 80%
$40 20%
$32 80%
Next 
Choice-Situation 9
$77 90%
$2 10%
$40 90%
$32 10%
Next 
Choice-Situation 10
$77 100%$40 100%
Next 
Fig. 9 Screen shots from the risk preference experiment
Each subject was presented with forty choice-situations. As displayed in Fig. 10a,
the first ten choice-situations have a prize space of $32/$40 and $2/$77 which cor-
respond to the “20x” lotteries used by Holt and Laury (2002). The other thirty
choice-situations use the same ten probability distributions but with three different
prize spaces. All of the prize spaces used in the experiment are depicted in Fig. 10a–d,
and a detail of each of the 40 choice-situations can be found in the online Appendix C.
We included the additional 30 lotteries to achieve finer parametric resolution on risk
preferences.
5.1 Sample
The sample for our risk-preference experiment is comprised of 114 individuals: 56
men and 58 women (49.1% and 50.9%, respectively). As can be seen in Table 9 the
average BAC of these sub-samples were 0.061% for men and 0.062% for women.
The cumulative sample distribution functions of BAC for both men and women are
displayed in Fig. 11. While this sample has additional observations at 0.000% BAC,
relative to our GARP and independence samples, the distribution of measured BACs
is again fairly uniform between 0.020% and 0.125%.
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Lotteries 1-10 (Holt & Laury 20x)a b
c d
$40
$32
$77
$2
Lotteries 11-20
$30
$22
$70
$5
Lotteries 21-30
$50
$25
$80
$6
Lotteries 31-40
$27
$18
$65
$7
Fig. 10 The four prize spaces used to measure risk preferences
5.2 Analysis
To identify how risk preferences vary with BAC we assume choosers possess a ran-
dom utility representation and proceed by calibrating risk preferences with maximum
likelihood methods. For the two lotteries (Lsaf e and Lrisky) in each choice-situation
we assign random utility levels:
U(Lsaf e) = EU(Lsaf e) + saf e (3)
U(Lrisky) = EU(Lrisky) + risky (4)
where EU(·) is the systematic, expected utility of a given lottery, EU(L) =
p1u(z1) + p2u(z2), and  is an additive error component. We assume that choosers
possess a utility (Bernoulli) function over monetary prizes of the constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) form,31
u(z) = z
1−θ
1 − θ (5)
If we can assume that the additive error components for random utility are indepen-
dently, identically distributed Type I extreme value then choice probabilities take on
the standard logit form:
Prob[Lsaf e ∗ Lrisky] = e
[EU(Lsaf e)]/κ
e[EU(Lsaf e)]/κ + e[EU(Lrisky )]/κ (6)
Prob[Lrisky ∗ Lsaf e] = e
[EU(Lrisky )]/κ
e[EU(Lsaf e)]/κ + e[EU(Lrisky )]/κ (7)
31We have also calibrated models with a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) Bernoulli but find
significantly better fits with CRRA in this dataset.
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Table 9 Risk-Sample Characteristics
N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 56 0.061 0.041 0.000 0.160
Female 58 0.062 0.056 0.000 0.211
Total 114 0.062 0.050 0.000 0.211
All numbers (except sample sizes) are % BAC
where we use the notation Lsaf e ∗ Lrisky to indicate that the safe lottery was
selected over the risky one. To explore how risk preferences might vary with observ-
able attributes, we permit the relative risk aversion parameter (θ), and the error
dispersion parameter (κ) to vary as linear-in-parameters functions of BAC and sex.32
Mathematically, we express θ and κ as:
θ = θ0 + θ1BACi + θ21(Female)i + θ3(BACi ∗ 1(Female)i) (8)
κ = 1 + κ1BACi + κ21(Female)i (9)
Table 10 reports estimation results from four different maximum likelihood esti-
mates of a systematically varying CRRA specification. As commonly found in
studies exploring risk preferences, women in our sample are more risk averse than
men (Eckel and Grossman 2008; Croson and Gneezy 2009). We also find male- and
female-specific blood alcohol effects. Consider the parameter estimates in Model
(4): A representative male with a BAC of 0.000% has relative risk aversion of 0.551,
which corresponds to what Holt and Laury label as “risk averse” (this is also the
most frequent type of chooser for their “20x real” design). If our representative male
imbibed enough alcohol to arrive at a BAC of 0.100% he would become more risk
averse and have relative risk-aversion of 0.606 which also corresponds to Holt and
Laury’s “risk averse” category.
Referring again to the parameter estimates of Model (4) in Table 10, a repre-
sentative female with a BAC of 0.000% has relative risk aversion of 0.758 which
corresponds to Holt and Laury’s “very risk averse” category. If that representative
female imbibed enough alcohol to arrive at a BAC of 0.100% her relative risk aver-
sion would decline to 0.681 which is right on the border between Holt and Laury’s
“risk averse” and “very risk averse” classifications. This representative female with a
BAC of 0.100% has a relative risk aversion that is statistically indistinguishable from
a representative male with a BAC of 0.100%. Moreover, for the parameter estimates
in Model (4), men and women would have identical relative risk aversions at a BAC
of 0.157%.
That drunk women become more open towards risks could have implications for
policy. Consider a policy aimed at reducing risky behaviors in the population of drunk
32When we constrain the error dispersion parameter (κ) to be constant across BAC and sex, we find signifi-
cantly reduced maximized log-likelihood values. Moreover, based on the findings from our IA experiment,
the dispersion-parameter estimate for BAC (κ1) bears the expected signs.
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Fig. 11 Risk sample BAC characteristics. The solid vertical line depicts 0.080% BAC, the legal driving
limit in many U.S. states
Table 10 Maximum likelihood estimates of CRRA utility with systematically varying θ and κ
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Systematically varying CRRA parameters (θ)
Constant (θ1) 0.578∗∗∗ 0.552∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.021)
BAC (θ2) −0.132 0.330 −0.138 0.553
(0.285) (0.373) (0.303) (0.368)
Female (θ3) 0.092∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.041) (0.030) (0.041)
BAC*1(Female) (θ4) – −0.791∗∗∗ – −1.322
(0.387) (0.392)
Systematically varying error dispersion parameters (κ)
BAC (κ1) 6.771∗∗∗ 6.726∗∗∗ 3.852∗∗∗ 4.548∗∗∗
(1.564) (1.552) (1.184) (1.221)
Female (κ2) 0.015 −0.039 −0.248∗∗∗ −0.131∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.119) (0.089) (0.091)
Number Obs. 114 114 106 106
Log Likelihood −2265.4 −2263.3 −1944.5 −1938.8
Excl. Crit. N.A. N.A. FOSDi < 80% FOSDi < 80%
Riskyi = 100% Riskyi = 100%
Quantitative standard errors are in parentheses. See online Appendix C for details on how these are
calculated. Significance at the 1% level is denoted ∗∗∗, 5% as ∗∗, 10% as ∗
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choosers. According to our results, predictions of changes in men’s risky behavior
would be accurate if they were based on estimates of risk preferences collected from
sober men. In contrast, changes in drunk women’s risky choices would be dramati-
cally lower if estimates were used from sober women.33 Of course our samples are
in no way representative of the population of drunk choosers (even in NYC). Thus
drawing strong conclusions without additional research to determine whether our
risk-preference findings are the result of sampling, pharmacology, or selection would
be inappropriate.
6 Discussion and conclusion
The title of our paper raises the question of whether an expected utility maximizer
who walks into a bar and has several alcoholic beverages is likely to walk out an
EU-maximizer. While the results from our experiments indicate that almost no per-
fect EU-maximizers walk into bars, it appears that people walk out of bars not
dramatically less EU-maximizing than when they walked in. Our data also sug-
gest that choice consistency does not appreciably decline as blood alcohol levels
increase. Even highly intoxicated subjects, who had difficulty walking, remained
sensitive to incentive structures. While a huge body of evidence indicates that
the profoundly intoxicated have slower reaction times and reduced coordination
(Meyer and Quenzer 2005; Iversen et al. 2009) it was not the case that their choices in
our experiments became disordered, irrational, or insensitive to costs. That is a novel
observation that may have important implications for policy that are discussed below.
Our studies of risk attitudes as a function of blood alcohol level tell a similar
story. As blood alcohol level increased in our pool of subjects they continued to
broadly obey the independence axiom; their choices remained largely consistent with
regard to risky lotteries, even at very high blood alcohol levels. Our measurements
of actual risk attitudes, however, told a slightly different story. While we found that
the specific risk attitudes of males showed little change as a function of blood alco-
hol level, females did show a change in risk-attitudes. In our samples, female risk
attitudes converged towards those of males as blood alcohol levels increased; there
do not appear to be appreciable differences between women and men’s risk pref-
erences when they are intoxicated. This is also an observation of significance to
policy-makers. Policy-makers might well consider the possibility that the intoxicated
can consistently represent risks of penalties but should consider the possibility that
the intoxicated (and particularly females) have a heightened tolerance for these risks.
Before using these data to draw broad conclusions about the consistency and risk
attitudes of intoxicated Americans in general, however, a number of important issues
must be considered. Foremost among these is the sampling technique we employ:
33For a policy-maker, whether this apparent change in risk preferences is the result of selection, or is
causally related to BAC, is less of an issue if less risk averse women are disproportionately opting into
higher BACs. It would not change the fact that the population of drunk women is substantially less risk
averse than their sober counter-parts.
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We recruit participants from a single bar in a single New York neighborhood on
Tuesdays and Wednesday nights during a single year. This seriously limits the gen-
eralizability of our study. Additional studies are required. Further, we should note
that recruiting from the same bar led us to a relatively homogeneous sample in terms
of age and ethnicity (over 85% of our participants are between 25 and 34 years of
age; unfortunately, our Institutional Review Board required a sampling technique
that guaranteed the strictest of anonymity which excluded collection of ethnicity
information). This meant that we were unable to exploit exogenous variation in our
subject pool to explain changes in preferences or adherence to revealed preference
axioms across sub-populations.
Another problem with our study was that we identified our econometric estimates
on between-subject variation in BAC when our research question would be better
addressed using within-subject variation. A more controlled way of performing
our measurements would be to experimentally control the BAC of our participants
through either random assignment or with the use of treatment and placebo groups.
However, this approach also has two principal disadvantages. First, our Institutional
Review Board considered any such procedure unethical. Second, it would have
driven us towards a finding more likely to reflect something about pharmacology
than about the macroeconomy. Exploring the effects of variation in BAC that occurs
in “the wild” was our primary goal because it is this variation that is relevant to
economic outcomes. Indeed, List (2006) has argued that representativeness of envi-
ronment may be the most important factor for generalizability of behavior in a large
class of experiments and it was with this consideration in mind that we focused our
efforts on a field-based approach.
A related criticism is that individuals likely to opt-into high levels of BAC might
also be those less likely to violate GARP or IA at any BAC level. That is also an
important point, although perhaps more for a biologist than for a policy-maker inter-
ested in the behavior of intoxicated New Yorkers. We note, however, that females
in our sample tended to have lower Afriat Indices, Houtman-Maks measures, and
were more likely to violate the independence axiom. And yet, females were also
more likely (conditional on their being female) to experience higher BAC levels in
our samples. The critical point here is that if there were a meaningful difference in
rationality between sober and intoxicated states, a policy aimed at preventing people
from becoming intoxicated would be more effective than one aimed at altering the
behavior of individuals who are already intoxicated. But that is not what we observed
in this study.
In terms of an algorithmic approach towards human decision-making, the weak
relationship between BAC and adherence to GARP that we observed suggests that
consistent choice behavior must be a relatively robust feature of human decision-
making as was originally suggested by Becker and Murphy (1988). This robustness
indicates that economists can, in principle, model choices by alcohol intoxicated indi-
viduals with the same suite of tools that are applied to more standard samples. Our
observation that female preferences change as a function of BAC also suggests an
important validation of the Bernheim and Rangel (2004) approach to modeling incon-
sistent choice in at least one intoxicated population. More generally, this apparent
robustness also suggests a relatively wide purview for the application of economic
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models and ensuing policy analyses when intoxicated individuals are an object of
consideration. We note, however, that our data cannot be used, indeed they must not
be used, to argue that all drugs of abuse are like alcohol in this regard. Growing
evidence indicates that subjects consuming drugs of abuse that specifically alter the
activity of brain systems employing the neurotransmitter dopamine probably cannot
be modeled as rational (Redish 2004; Caplin and Dean 2008). Were this same experi-
ment to be conducted in cocaine users it is almost certain that a different result would
have been obtained. It is critical to remember that each category of drug of abuse
must be examined separately and that the results we present here pertain only to alco-
hol (Redish et al. 2008; Koob and Volkow 2010). That is a hugely important point of
which policy-makers must be aware.
In summary, these data lead us to conclude that additional tests of the robustness
of preference coherence in more varied populations of intoxicated individuals will
vastly enhance economists’ understanding of the explicit boundaries of our model-
ing tool-kit. Our study validates, with regard to alcohol, both the Becker and Murphy
(1988) approach and the Bernheim and Rangel (2004) approach and suggests that
these models can and should be tested with regard to drugs of abuse. For exam-
ple, understanding whether heroin addicts really are as consistent in their choices
for opiods as non-addicts are in their choices for grocery store items could pro-
vide valuable insights into the boundaries of economic models. Furthermore, the
idea that preference coherence could substantively change as intoxication changes
leads naturally to other domains in which “cognitive impairment” might affect
economists’ ability to model choices using standard methods. Indeed, recent neuro-
biological evidence suggests that damage to regions of the brain typically implicated
in value-based decision-making could compromise adherence to GARP (Camille
et al. 2011). Certainly it would be important to understand the extent to which the
choices of individuals with cognitively debilitating diseases like Multiple Sclerosis,
Parkinson’s Disease, or Alzheimer’s Disease can, in principle, be modeled with
standard economic tools.
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